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THE REPUBLIC, CONVERSATIONS ON FUNDAMENTALS. By Charles A. Beard.
New York: The Viking Press, 1943. Pp. xiii, 365. $3.00.
CHARLES A. BEARD'S The Republic was, upon publication, hailed by The
Nation and Fortune as a classic. There must be something exceptional about
a book when two groups so divergent as those which these magazines repre-
sent both offer unstinted acclaim, although the title's reminder of Plato's
immortal work had already invited a comparison. Like Plato's Republic
Beard's work consists of a fictitious conversation, or rather a series of con-
versations, such as might occur at his home in New Milford, Connecticut. But
whereas Plato casts Socrates in the role of the teacher, Beard pictures him-
self as the key figure. The discussions are concerned with American govern-
ment and politics. As a result, they lack that universality which gave Plato's
work its philosophical significance. An inquiry into the nature of justice is
everyone's concern. Yet, at the same time, preoccupation with an abstract idea
will repel those who believe that reality lies elsewhere, in concrete, historical
experience. Plato and Beard live in totally different realms of the mind, and
the chief concern of the one is at most a minor concern for the other.
Beard has evidently done a lot of reading in The Federalist. His book is,
in essentials, a modernized version of these papers, written by Hamilton large-
ly in defense of the Constitution, with progressive overtones added here and
there. Presumably, Alexander Hamilton would take a different view of some
matters, were he living today. I suspect that he would be Mr. Roosevelt's
Secretary of War or of the Treasury. In any case, the basic teachings of The
Federalist concerning constitutional government are here expounded with the
Olympian serenity of a past master at "political fundamentals." For whatever
one may think of Charles A. Beard's views in particulars, there can be little
question that he towers today as the grand old man of the study of American
politics in historical perspective. In this preoccupation with American consti-
tutional experience lies both the strength and the limitation of his, treatment.
It is, of course, impossible to review the many specific questions Beard's vol-
ume raises. It is more profitable to consider a few basic issues.
Beard is associated with the economic interpretation of the Constitution. And
yet Beard's outlook on the role of ideas in history has undergone profound
change. He has for some years been insisting that he was misunderstood. This
may be so. But when as lucid a mind as Oliver Wendell Holmes read Beard
as meaning "that really the adoption of the Constitution wois due to the
moneyed interests," 1 others may be pardoned for gaining the same impression.
1. Letter to John C. Wu, June 21, 1928, cited in LERNER, TnE MIND AND FAxI
oF JusTicE HoL=.ES (1943) 434-35.
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However that may be, Beard today stresses "the force of ideas in history." 2
"I sometimes think that politics is more of a determining force in history
than economics," 3 he says at one point. It is a shift in emphasis, which gives
Beard a much more balanced view, but it does not make him a Platonist.
Ideas in his meaning of the term are functional, dynamic, changing; the, are
factors in the historical process working in the minds of men and in time.
As such, they are very different from Plato's ideas--timeless, changeless,
eternal things, which no finite mind can ever behold directly.
"You do me too much honor by associating me with Socrates. .... If I pns-
sessed even a hundredth part of his acumen in analyzing ideas, I should be
happy. But in another way I want to steer entirely clear of both Socrates and
Plato. In my opinion, Greek metaphysics has done damage, not good, to the
Western world and to Christian thought and practice. If modern Europeans
had devoted to the study of The Fcdcralist the attention they gave to Plato's
Republic, they would have been far better off in every way." 4 Cheers from
the editors of Fortune greeted this pronouncement. I do not agree with it.
In point of fact, Europeans have given undue attention to The Fedcralist
among American writings on politics (it was the only one included among
Meinecke's Klassiker, if I remember correctly). This attention to the Federal-
ist has been quite unfortunate; the writings of Jefferson, Lincoln, and Wood-
row Wilson, to name a few, were really more important. For it is the genuinely
democratic, in contrast to the constitutional tradition, which has been lacking
in Europe.5 And while I share Beard's misgivings about Plato, the antidote
was not Hamilton, but Tom Paine and Abe Lincoln.
Why bother with this detail? Because it is highly symptomatic of Beard's
nationalism, a strand which runs all through his treatment and comes into full
bloom in his chapter entitled, "The Republic in the World of Nations." Here
the isolationist position is given a persuasive setting by stating the opposing
views in so inadequate a fashion as to be laughable. Unfortunately, these carica-
tures are rather true to life. The burning need of America's participation in
world affairs is too frequently presented in such confused and sentimental ways
as to be self-defeating. Magistrally, Beard announces at the outset of the dis-
cussion: "In my opinion, the supreme object of American foreign policy should
be to protect and promote the interests, spiritual and material, of the American
people, and, subject to that mandate, to conduct foreign affairs in such a man-
ner as to contribute to the peace and civilization of mankind." 0 Amen. Who
could possibly disagree? But does he permit any of his interlocutors to state
the case for the internationalist position in those terms? Or does he attempt




5. See FnrinzcH, THE NEw Ba.I IN THE CoMM.oN MAN (1942) c. IL
6. P. 307.
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Beard published an article in Harper's Magazine, entitled "Giddy Minds and
Foreign Quarrels." In this article he ridiculed the President and all those who
thought that the war that was being fought in Europe had something to do
with that supreme object of American foreign policy. The article cried out
for a reply; I wanted someone to say, "A stitch in time saves nine." Such a
reply was never made. But a special edition of the article was sold in tens of
thousands to confuse the minds of men who within a little more than a year
had to don a uniform to fight in the most gigantic conflict America ever has
gotten into. Why was it gigantic? Because we waited until the conflagration
had reached our own backyard. Those who wanted the United States to in-
terest herself in the fire when it -had merely a small start-Hitler destroying
democracy in Germany-and who later urged that America aid the allies be-
cause they were our ramparts, were denounced as giddy minds who wanted
the United States to engage in foreign quarrels, as meddlers who wanted
America to swim against the stream of the wave of the future.
It is a frequent reaction of readers of the Platonic dialogues to get very
tired of and even irritated with Socrates. His being always in the right, and
with a slightly patronizing air at that, they find hard to endure. This reviewer
has to confess that there are recurrent moments when he likewise feels a bit
annoyed with Beard. This was the more upsetting to the reviewer as he has
cherished for many years a profound affection for the philosophical farmer
of New Milford. His gentle irony, his keen sense of -humor, his range of
human sympathies, all endear him to those who know him well. Above all,
his sterling character born of deep conviction makes him a true representative
of the common man, that is the mainstay of a free people. The scorn which he
heaps upon the mere intellectual runs like a red thread through these dis-
courses on political fundamentals. Take, for example, this sample. "Beard:
Which Walter Lippmann? Whiteworth: What do you mean by that? Beard:
I mean that in the course of his meanderings he has been on nearly every side
of every question, in one way or another, from socialism to world salvation." 7
Beard has hoed a straight row. He has always been, and he remains in this
book, the ardent American progressive, the friend of the people, the believer
in the American destiny.
And this brings us back to our original query. What is it that makes The
Republic at this time appeal to both conservatives and liberals? Part of the
explanation may, of course, lie in the fact, if it be a fact, that the people writ-
ing the two magazines are of rather similar opinions. In any case, the positions
of the liberal conservative and the liberal liberal and the radical liberal have
had a tendency to merge under the pressure emanating from the Fascist and
Communist elements. Beard is certainly neither one nor the other. He has a
firm grip on the quintessence of American constitutional democracy. He has,




contexts other than the American. These doubts are not without foundation.
Yet this reviewer believes that they are going to turn out true only if Ameri-
can policy is guided by them. We have arrived at a juncture in world affairs
where we have an opportunity to shape the world in our image, if we will.
If our faith in our own convictions is not strong enough, the world may go
another way. So doing, it may one day turn upon us. It is upon this score that
Beard fails us, believers in America's spiritual destiny, at this decisive hour.
Yet even the founders of the Republic had this faith. In Beard's beloved
Federalist we read: "It seems to have been reserved to the people of this
country, by their conduct and example, to decide . . . whether societies of men
are really capable or not, of establishing good government from reflection and
choice. . . The crisis, at which we are arrived, may be regarded as the era in
which that decision is to be made; and a wrong election of the part we shall
act, may . . . deserve to be considered as the general misfortune of man-
kind." 8 Beard exclaims toward the end, when opposing the gloomy prophets
of fate: "Besides fate or determinism, there is crealhve intelligence in the
world, and there is also opportunity to exercise our powers, intellectual and
moral." 9 Why does our beloved uncle Charley refuse to recognize the direc-
tion in which that creative intelligence is pointing all over the world today,?
The world is one and yet it is not. There lies the task of the future.
OmL J. FRcEDRicH t
LAWFUL ACTION OF STATE MILITARY FORCES. By Edmund Ruffin Beckvith,
James G. Holland, George W. Bacon, and Joseph W. McGovern. New
York: Random House, 1944. Pp. xviii, 216. $3.00.
No more extraordinary result of our dual system of government exists than
our system of state military forces. Unquestionably the system seems stranger
to us than it did to the framers of the United States Constitution, who had no
difficulty in visualizing the states in their former status of full sovereignty. It
is hard to realize that a state may, under section 10 of article I of the United
States Constitution, wage war if invaded or in imminent danger, not merely
in the sense that an aroused citizenry, in the phrase of William Jennings Bryan,
would leap to arms between sunrise and sunset, but in the same sense that
Russia is now waging war against Germany. Then, too, there is an eerie
quality about a state of affairs under which a young broker who has joined
the "squadron" can be called to the telephone at a deb party and find himself
in a couple of hours at a gate in a barbed wire fence around a steel mill hold-
8. H.Amu.TON, TnE FEDnMIAST (1788) No. 1, 1-2.
9. P. 342.
1 Professor of Government, Director of the School for Overseas Administration,
Harvard University.
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ing a rifle and peering through the cold dawn at a threatening mass of pickets.
Strange as the condition has been, people have accepted it like the weather.
The introduction to Lawful Action of State Military Forces modestly states
the authors' "belief" that' it is the pioneer book in its special field. The state-
ment might truthfully have been made much stronger. The subject is so
difficult that it has taken a hundred and fifty years to get up the courage to
tackle it. The lawful action of peace officers is probably just as difficult a
subject, but the insolubility of that mare's nest of hair-line distinctions in the
matter of the peace officer's right to arrest will never be cleared up so long as
peace officers have that best of all defenses, "I am judgment-proof."
The young broker in the squadron has no such defense and his problems
are even more difficult. As the introduction to Lawful Action of State Mili-
tary Forces puts it: "The constitutional provisions authorize the maintenance
by a state of military forces but inflexibly require that in every circumstance
such forces are governed by the law of the land. All the rules of permissible
action when state troops are on domestic duty are referable to this standard,
so that in contrast to the unlimited violence which the soldier metes out to
foreign foes his action at home is always restrained by the civil law." 1 In
other words, the state militiaman is given the responsibility of producing
military results but is deprived of full military powers. The Supreme Court
in Luther v. Borden 2 settled everything with the pronouncement, "No more
force . . .can be used than is necessary to accomplish the object," and took
up the next case.
How lawyers ever kept to such a straight and narrow path of practicality as
have the authors is almost beyond comprehension. Few would have the self-
control to avoid the primrose path of speculation as to how, with state militia
outlawed by section 61 of the National Defense Act of 1916,3 guardsmen could
be taken into federal service under their oaths as state militiamen. 4 Yet even
the annotated, as opposed to the bare-text, edition of the book contains a mini-
mum of logomachy. No better illustration of the way in which the handbook
gets down to the facts of life can be found than its treatment of the problem
of when to shoot into a mob. The tragic "volley over the heads of the crowd"
is properly condemned. Gunfire "should never be employed ineffectually or
as a mere threat." 5 The authors are willing to concede that picketing can be
peaceful, yet go as far as to say that when picketing in the particular dispute
has always resulted in violefice for which the pickets or their sympathizers
were responsible, then the right of picketing must give way before the more
necessary obligation of the state to preserve law and order. Evidently, how-
1. P.xv.
2. 7 How. 1, 46 (U. S. 1849).
3. 39 STAT. 166, 198 (1916), 32 U. S. C. § 194 (1940).




ever, the authors have not stretched their consciences by making things clear
which actually are confused. There is, or used to be, a system of teaching law
under which the subject is carefully shorn of all inconsistencies and the right
answers to the examination questions are those which flow logically from the
"first principles" with which the teacher has chosen to start-splendid training
for the young folks, but one must not forget to tell them that the ammunition
with which they are being furnished is blank. There is no such danger here.
The occasional statement in the book, "That is a question which has not yet
been decided"--as, for instance, with respect to the jurisdiction of military
commissions and provost courts over civilians-heightens the impression given
the reader that he is receiving instruction, not mere mental training.
The excellent discussion of the use of state troops under the constitutional
provision for their employment to repel invasion was happily of more obvious
importance when the Japanese still held Kiska and Attu and the Germans still
held Stalingrad. No one would, however, advocate its omission on that ac-
count. It is to be hoped that England had something comparable ready in the
dark days of the Battle of Britain. Surely, we had nothing of the kind.
It is hard to find fault with the manual. At first blush, some of the deci-
sions when translated into soldier's language are startling. For instance, it
is stated that the courts will not review a refusal of the governor to call out
the troops, but that if the governor does decide to call them out, the courts
will review his decision if the facts compel a finding that his action was de-
signed to serve an illegal purpose or was capricious or arbitrary.6 Few lawyers
have realized that the effect of Sterling v. Constanlin 7 on the doctrine of the
separation of governmental powers was to form a rule that while the court can-
not order out state troops the federal court, at least, can order them back; but
that seems to be the simple truth and another of the difficulties of state sol-
diering.
To an outsider it appears to have been a mistake for such a practical treatise
to have forsaken the term "martial law." One cannot but regret that some
other way was not found for emphasizing the theme of this book that there is
no such thing as martial law and that what is commonly meant by the term
is the state of affairs that exists wherever competent authority has directed
that local executive power shall be partly or wholly exercised by the military
commander during the emergency. It is all very well for the authors,
at the first place where the subject comes up, to explain that the better term
"martial rule" will be used instead. Some, indeed it is to be hoped a great
many, will read from cover to cover; but more will use the book as a source
of answers to particular problems. They are likely to be puzzled by the use
of an unfamiliar term for a familiar idea, just as lawyers are tormented by
6. P. 45.
7. 287 U. S. 378 (1932).
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the modern special-definition form of statute, each word of which, like Humpty
Dumpty's, "means just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less."
Perhaps we are given all that there is on the right of state troops to enter
without a warrant, but after reading the book one is still puzzled by that
problem. In nonessential matters the advice seems sometimes too timid. Of
all the measures which might be used to prevent the recurrence of illegal sales
of liquor, destruction of the stock seems the most reasonably required, yet
the state soldier is cautioned against it. Much of our liquor legislation is di-
rected toward the well-known propensity of alcohol to run through a key-
hole. Yet no one could ask for a more encouraging treatment of the fun-
damentals, such as the critical question of the use of force: "The troops
act in defense of all the people and will never be on the scene except in
time of great public danger so that it may be appropriate for them to use
a degree of force which will be instantly decisive although such force
might be excessive if used in the ordinary police control of individual wrong-
doing. Should an officer or soldier be brought before a military or civil court
on the charge that he used excessive force, the court will take into account
the facts as the officer or soldier had reason to believe them to be at the time
he acted." 8
The title of the book, Lawful Action of State Military Forces, is to some
extent a misnomer, unless read in the light of the difficulty of expressing two
differing ideas in one phrase. About a quarter of the text is devoted to mili-
tary justice as affecting the members of the armed forces themselves. Far
from the book's being any less valuable on that account, it is more valuable
than its title indicates. The state soldier who is to be called upon for legal
advice or action will find within its covers (especially the edition containing
in a supplement annotations on the law, a list of forms, and a topical summary
of the rights of officers and men) about everything there is to know about
this hitherto untouched subject.
It is not safe for a common lawyer to say that the book ought to be in
the hands of every state soldier; that involves the expression of an opinion
in the field of military policy. But it is safe to say that, if it is good for a
given state soldier to know the law of his profession, he ought to have this
book. The authors who have set out into the unmapped wilderness of their
subject and given their services, and the publisher which has done its part at
cost, deserve the thanks of the country for their patriotic enterprise.
EDWARD J. DimocK
S. P. 100.
t Lecturer in Law, Yale Law School.
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MAJORITY RULE AND MINORITY RIGHTS. By Henry Steele Commager. New
York: Oxford University Press, 1943. Pp. 92. $1.50.
MR. COmmAGER'S little book is a reconsideration of a very old, a very basic,
and a very challenging question, "the problem of majority rule versus limited
government." 1 His treatment, however, is limited to American experience:
and his book resolves into a bitter attack upon judicial review.
According to Mr. Commager, American democracy embodies two funda-
mental principles: "the principle that men make government, and the prin-
ciple that there are limits to the authority of government." 2 A philosophy
of the "tyranny of the majority" was formulated by conservatives desirous of
protecting minority rights. Not content with limiting the jurisdiction of gov-
ernment through checks and balances, they added the new institution of judi-
cial review.3 Mr. Commager develops what he characterizes as the Jeffer-
sonian contention that judicial review is "wrong in theory and dangerous in
practice," 4 and argues that American experience justifies Jefferson's faith
"that men need no masters-not even judges." r The majority-minority para-
dox is resolved in favor of the majority. He concludes that we should "take
more seriously" Jefferson's "faith in majority rule and his fear of any insti-
tution which repudiates the philosophy of majority will or deprives it of the
advantages of free play," 0 and that we have no reason to be less confident
than Jefferson was "of the ability of majorities to tolerate dissent or of the
safety with which error may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat
it." 7
The question which Mr. Commager discusses is one which has been heatedly
debated among the present members of the United States Supreme Court and
his book is dedicated, appropriately enough, to Justice Frankfurter, who, in his
opinions in the Jehovah's Witnesses cases, has consistently upheld the right of
legislative majorities to regulate this religious minority, and who has cau-
tioned his colleagues that their use of the judicial negative in the field of civil
liberties may jeopardize democratic processes.8 Mr. Commager, however,
takes a much more extreme position on the vexing question of judicial review
than the Justice whom he admires. As justice Frankfurter has pushed further
the Holmes doctrine of "the reasonable man," so Mr. Commager's condemna-
tion of the use of the judicial negative is more sweeping than Frankfurter's.
In stating the issue in such dogmatic "all" or "none" terms he weights the








8. Vest Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 646 (1943).
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guarded. In discussing the role of the Court in the Gobitis case, for example,
he says that "guardianship of deeply-cherished liberties may be safely entrusted
to legislatures where all the effective means of inducing political change are
left free from interference." 9 The qualification is important, and it is one
which Mr. Commager does not make.
Several important phases of the majority-minority issue are omitted from
Mr. Commager's discussion. He fails to give due emphasis to the fact that
today's "minorities" may be tomorrow's "majority" and that in the long run
restrictive legislation may stifle the very "majority" which he holds so dear.
Perhaps the most serious limitation of the study is its preoccupation with the
individual and its failure to give proper weight to the importance of the group
character of present-day society. As Mr. Riesman has suggested, the time has
come for a reorientation of our discussion of civil liberties issues in terms of
the role played by groups in public affairs.' 0 The same would seem to be true
in the case of the majority-minority paradox.
One may agree with much of Mr. Commager's criticism of the use of judi-
cial review in the past and yet not agree with his argument that it has no place
in the future. As Justice Robert H. Jackson pointed out before he became a
member of the Supreme Court: "The vice of judicial supremacy, as exerted
for ninety years in the field of policy, has been its progressive closing of the
avenues to peaceful and democratic conciliation of our social and economic
conflicts." 11 Is it not possible that judges with a proper sense of restraint
may reforge it into an important instrument of democracy by using it to keep
open the avenues of peaceful and democratic conciliation? It is a thesis sug-
gested by Justices Stone and Jackson in their opinions in the Jehovah's Wit-
nesses cases 12 and ably argued by Mr. Lusky in the pages of this Journal."
It is a point of view which Mr. Commager mentions, but fails to explore fully.
Although "the real battles of liberalism are not to be won in any court," as
Mr. Commager very properly points out, the fight may well be lost there.
LOUISE OVERACKER t
9. Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586, 600 (1940) (italics added).
10. This point is ably discussed by David Riesman in Civil Liberties it a Period of
Tranition in PUBLIC POLICY 1942, 33-96.
11. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY (1941) 321.
12. See Chief Justice Stone's opinion in United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U. S.
144, 152 (1938) and his dissenting opinion in Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310
U. S. 586, 605 (1940); see also Mr. Justice Jackson's opinion in West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette, 31'9 U. S. 624, 625 (1943).
13. Lusky, Minority Rights and the Public Interest (1942) 52 YALE, L. J. 1.
I Chairman of the Department of Political Science, Wellesley College.
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CRMINAL CAREERS IN RETROsPECT. By Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck. New
York: The Commonwealth Fund, 1943. Pp. x, 380. $3.50.
THE Gluecks' achievement is unique. For over fifteen years they have fol-
lowed the life course of 500 youthful offenders after their release from the
Massachusetts Reformatory and published results after every five-year span.
This volume embraces the third such span.
The average age of the men at their discharge from the reformatory was
twenty-five years. They are, consequently, about forty years old now and well
along in middle life. The authors started with 510 men of whom 439 were
still living at the onset of the investigation presented in this volume.
Five full stories of the lives of nine of the men are given as fair examples,
and in the ensuing chapters reference is repeatedly made to these life-histories.
In the first part of the book there are chapters presenting and discussing sta-
tistical material on environmental circumstances, family relations, and economic
responsibilities, work and leisure, criminal conduct, differences and resem-
blances between various offenders, reasons for relapse into delinquency.
Concerning criminal conduct the authors say: "Obviously, the improvement
in the third over the second period is less marked than between the second
and first." I During the report period 208 men (of 439) were arrested, "which
represents 57 per cent of the group about whom the information was known
and applicable, as compared with 55.1 per cent arrested in Period II and
70.7 per cent in Period ." 
2
The chapters of the second part of the book deal with the response of of-
fenders to peno-correctional treatment, their behavior during treatment, and
successes and failures inside and outside of institutions. Some boys do better
under parole, some in institutions; reasons for this difference are discussed.
Better natural endowment plays a role in favor of freEr treatment. A few men
did well in the armed forces (the report period ends 1937 1) ; some did not.
Criminal Careers in Prospect is the title of the book's third part. Its chap-
ters are devoted to predicting behavior during the fifteen years of observation
and under various forms of extra- and intramural treatment. In the last chap-
ter implications of the findings are developed.
There is an appendix with definitions and three appendices with elaborate
statistics. The alphabetic index should be mentioned for completeness' sake
and for the regrettable reason that there are still scientific books published
without an index.
In the last chapter a number of proposals are presented. Offenders ought to
be classified according to prediction or predictability. According to these
predictions correctional measures should be instituted. The retributive-expia-
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approach can only be performed by a board consisting of particularly trained
specialists (including judge, psychiatrist, psychologist, social worker).
One paragraph in particular sums up clearly how the authors have come to
see their fundamental problem:
"We are thus led to the conclusion that it is not primarily or fundamentally
either chance or the fear of punishment, but rather the presence or absence of
certain traits and characteristics in the constitution and early environment of
the different offenders, which determines their respective responseg to the dif-
ferent forms of treatment and determines, also, what such offenders 10ll lilli-
mately become and what will become of them. Those who behaved well, either
during or after treatment, were, as a class, more favorably endowed by Nature
and circumstanced by Nurture than were those who did not respond well." 3
It appears to me that in this book "the presence and absence of certain traits
and characteristics in the constitution" are given more leeway than they had
been given before. The overwhelming influence attributed to the environment,
particularly in the earlier years of life, is dimmed down a little. It must, of
course, be realized that constitutional assets and liabilities can only develop and
function in environments. The great task is to find out which environmental
factors fit best with which potential assets and which environmental factors
disfavor the development of potential liabilities. We certainly are glad that
in this tremendous task criminology has begun to co6perate in research and in
practice. Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck have been doing pioneer work in the
field and have done it very well.
EUGENE KAHN t
T1rRADING WITH THE ENEMY IN WORLD WAR II. By Martin Domke. New
York: Central Book Co., 1943. Pp. xvi, 640. $10.00.
THE development of economic warfare, which has reached proportions
never heretofore known, is evidenced in this country, aside from blacklists,
preemptive buying, etc., by the "freezing" of the funds of all European and
Japanese foreigners through whom American assets might have reached the
enemy countries, and by the vesting of new powers in the Alien Property
Custodian. The vast occupations of the enemy Powers have seriously modi-
fied the old conceptions of nationality or domicile as the test of enemy charac-
ter, and have expanded greatly the administrative definitions and classifications
of "enemy" and "ally of enemy." The "loyalty" test beclouds former cate-
gories. The expansion of the concept of "enemy nationals" and of "nation-
als- of a designated enemy country" has made the experience of earlier wars
somewhat less useful, and has made an authoritative guide to their interpreta-
tion indispensable.
3. P. 285.
t Sterling Professor of Psychiatry and Mental Hygiene, Yale University.
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Such a guide is furnished by the work of Mr. Domke. He brings to the
task not only a wide European experience in the conflict of laws, arising out
of the impact of war on private property relations, but has acquainted himself
in truly admirable fashion with the statutes, administrative regulations, and
cases dealing with all aspects of this complicated subject, not only in this
country but in other countries as well. While much of the material on foreign
funds and alien property control is statutory, and while he presents the cases
at considerable length, the presentation makes interesting reading, in which
the background of an expert is evident throughout. Even the occasional ffnr-
eignisms 1 lend an authenticity to the work which is not unattractive.
One of the manifestations of the new dispensation is the recession of Con-
gressional control, if not indeed of law, and the advance of administrative
regulation, if not discretion. This makes tie task of the lawyer in weaving
his way through the mysterious web of administrative regulation the more
difficult. Whereas during the first World War we found that section 9 of
the Trading with the Enemy Act 2 afforded a judicial remedy against mis-
taken seizures by the Custodian, a section which alone was deemed to give
constitutionality to the statute, we now find that a claims committee in the Cus-
todian's office decides questions of ownership without judicial review. The
contest over this issue is not yet settled.
The occupation of so many countries by the enemy Powers under various
regimes, the existence of so many governments-in-exile located at London,
has brought to the courts and to the administrative agencies problems rare,
if not always unique, in character. The position of Unoccupied France, mak-
ing a distinction between blocked nationals and enemy nationals, was new. It
would be interesting to know how the South American countries that have
frozen foreign assets have administered their law. Sometimes persons are
exempt from the classification of enemy, but not their property. Only an
authoritative guide can clarify the confusion.
Trading is so largely connected with suing that two chapters of the book
are devoted to the subject of suits by and against enemies. The new de-
velopments of economic warfare have necessitated chapters on Acting for the
Benefit of the Enemy, and Blacklisted Individuals and Corporations. Patents
and trade marks and licensing, as an exemption from tile restrictions of the
Trading with the Enemy Act, receive important attention. So does foreign
exchange control, independently of freezing, and the many problems involved
in the effort of the governments-in-exile to assume control over the assets of
their nationals located in third States. Some of these problems in the con-
flict of laws have not occurred before.3
1. See, inter alia, pp. 4, 42, 50, 51, 58, 59, 66, 76, 78, 93, 127, 131, 140, 150, 182, 188.
2. 40 STAT. 411 (1919), 50 U. S. C., App. §9 (1940).
3. See the reversals by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in the Strarshopf and
related cases, United States cx rel. Zdunic v. Uhl, 137 F. (2d) 858 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943);
United States ex reL. Schwarzkopf v. Uhl, 137 F. (2d) 893 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943).
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The body of the work consists of only 381 pages. Approximately 170
pages consist of appendices, embracing statutes, regulations, and judicial opin-
ions, both of this country and of the British Empire, which are important in
understanding the interpretations of the Trading with the Enemy Act. This
includes the Colonna 4 and the Kawato 5 cases in the United States Supreme
Court, and the V/O Sovfracht case 1 in the House of Lords. A table of cases,
a list of authors cited, bibliography, and subject index complete a work that
must be welcomed by all students and practitioners of these new pliase,4 of
economic warfare..
EDWIN BORCHARD t
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT. By Carl B. Swisher. Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1943. Pp. xiii, 1079. $4.50.
JUST why historians have pretty generally deserted the field of American
constitutional history, once their favorite preserve, is ,not entirely clear. Per-
liaps it is because the fashion in which they once studied institutional origins
proved to be unrewarding; perhaps, because constitutional history came to
be studied so largely in terms of Supreme Court decisions and they felt in-
competent in that sphere. There has, at any rate, been a regrettable scarcity
of writing in this field by historians. When, for example, the Historical Asso-
ciation published a volume growing out of the 1937 Sesquicentennial meeting
of the Association entitled The Constitution Reconsidered, only six out of a
total of twenty-seven essays dealt with the American Constitution, and only
two of those were by historians. In that year Professor McLaughlin pub-
lished his Constitutional History of the United States, a book which clearly
belongs to the writing of the previous generation, as indicated both by the
point of view displayed in it and by the inclusion of only two chapters (out
of fifty-one) dealing with the period since the Reconstruction. Two volumes
of Professor Hockett's Constitutional History of the United States appeared
in 1939, but he drew even less upon recent writings than had Professor Mc-
Laughlin, and the second volume ends with the year 1876. A third projected
volume has not appeared.
It remained for a political scientist to make the first major attempt to pre-
pare a survey of American constitutional history based upon the writings of
the last half-century. It is a very careful and, within the scope of the author's
plan, a very thorough piece of work. It is not intended to be a work of inter-
4. Ex parte Colonna, 314 U. S. 510 (1942).
5. Ex parte Kawato, 317 U. S. 69 (1942).
6. Sovfracbt (v/o) v. Van Udens Sheepvaart en Agentur Maatschappij (N. V.
Gebr.), [1943] A. C. 203.
f Justus S. Hotchkiss Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
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pretation or one which deals primarily with constitutional ideas. Rather is
it intended as a descriptive survey, one which will be, used most frequently
as a text for courses on American constitutional history. It is, in nearly every
respect, dearly superior to any of the existing texts.
One of the major differences between Professor Swisher's book and those
to which I referred above is indicated by his allotment of space. In the present
work a single chapter of twenty-one pages is devoted to the antecedents of
the Constitution, while over two-thirds of the book deals with the period since
the Civil War, and five hundred pages of that is concerned with constitutional
development in the twentieth century. There are five chapters on the New
Deal era.
Professor Swisher has performed a very considerable service in organizing
and describing the vast amount of material which has poured from the legis-
lative hoppers and the court rooms since the Civil War, but I do regret that
the amount of detail in the last twro-thirds of the book was at the expense of
acute condensation in some of the earlier sections. I can agree that there is a
lot of good secondary material on the period leading up to the establishment
of the present form of government, and that a careful treatment of the last
seventy-five years was more needed than a restatement of what had been done
before. But it is to be remembered that Professor Swisher's book is primarily
a text; it seems to me that in a book intended to serve that function he has
not sufficiently dealt with the essential ideas and institutional practices which
go far toward explaining both why we have the system that we have, and why
it has been successful.
There was a longer period of constitutional development in this country
before 1787 than there has been since 1789. I am not arguing for an equal
amount of space for the earlier period, but I do think that any text on Ameri-
can constitutional history should attempt to indicate the development in this
country of the theory and practice of representative institutions, the separa-
tion of powers, the conception of fundamental law and the practice of written
constitutions, the origins of judicial review, and the rise of civil liberties.
The Federal Convention of 1787 is entitled to more than four pages in a book
in which ten of its pages deal with the story of Muscle Shoals and Boulder
Dam, a book that is, after all, devoted largely to the interpretation of the
document produced by that Convention.
The discussion of the Articles of Confederation is relatively adequate. The
student should get from it an understanding of the contribution made by that
important experiment, but I do not see where the student would get any under-
standing of the nature or importance of the first state constitutions, docu-
ments which greatly influenced the work of the founders, any more than he
would here obtain any dear idea of the extraordinary amount of basic agree-
ment on fundamental political ideas that there was in the Federal Convention.
The book is focused almost entirely on the development of the national
constitutional system, and that is justifiable for the period since the Civil
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"War. I think that it leads to a somewhat inadequate conception of constitu-
tional development not only for the period before 1787, but also for that be-
tween 1789 and 1861.
Mr. Swisher's treatment of the work of the Supreme Court in the decades
preceding the Civil War is excellent, as is his discussion of the constitutional
problems growing out of the Bank and the slavery controversies. But lie says
virtually nothing about the great constitutional changes, such as the broaden-
ing of the suffrage, which were taking place in the states. He points out,
quite correctly, that Congress had, prior to 1860, enacted few regulatory
statutes applying to private enterprise.' He then goes on to say that "the
country was steeped in the laissez-faire ideas of Adam Smith." 2 This view
leaves out of account the great mass of state legislation through which the
states both regulated and initiated economic enterprise. And there is abundant
evidence that the doctrine of laissez-faire was just beginning to be widely
accepted by 1860. It did not flourish in this country until the seventies.
But if I am critical of Mr. Swisher's allotment of space and attention in
the part of the volume devoted to the period before the Civil War, I have
great admiration for his account of the last seventy-five years. His discussion
of this difficult period is marked by exceptional clarity and accuracy. It will
be of value both as a text and as a book of reference. A very full and care-
ful index adds greatly to its usefulness in the latter category.
BENJAMIN F. WRIGHT t
1. P. 272.
2. Ibid.
" Professor of Government, Harvard University.
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